The purpose of this is to provide transportation. To move you from where you are (you have, probably, heard of the FAA; and you, probably, believe that it yields forth some value for society) to where you need to be (a true understanding of benefit and risk). To provide efficient motion from where you are, toward reality.

The FAA is a standards setting body. It is the only standards setting and certification body in the United States for anything and everything having to do with civil aviation. It believes that the ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization of the UN), and the rest of the unorganized world, should do what it says. The FAA is incompetent at anything technical; like, for example, standards setting and certification.

How to explain the worst air travel delays, and the lowest level of air safety ever experienced, to a non technical audience?

Look around you. Have you ever been on an airplane, and heard somebody say "Look, over there, that's a DC-10"? If you were so close that you could tell what kind of other airplane, then you were involved in a near mid-air collision. This has become a quite common experience, and is a failure of the FAA to provide separation.

Try this: Duly logged measure of the failure of air traffic control to provide safe separation between aircraft. The FAA is, finally, starting to attempt to accurately count the number of them that occur daily!

This is provided in detail, for money: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2001/01/12/003.html but a short detail is also available for free if you search on Helsinki. This is why there isn't safe separation possible - the thing used to tell air traffic controllers where the airplanes are, doesn't.

You need to teach people much littler than you are about heavy traffic just off of curbs; then you need to learn about "coast mode" (you should be able to tell from the name), then you need to learn the difference between announced coast mode (the controller needs to constantly scan the data blocks of all of the hundred or so airplanes for which he is responsible) and unannounced coast mode (the controller is provided no information that the "radar" cannot see or track the airplane). Then you need to learn why that is and has been for a long time.

P0 suppression (the FAA requires of the people that do it no test equipment to properly align aircraft "radar" transponders).

P4 suppression (the FAA screwed up the equipment technical standards specification).

You are responsible for your own life (you wouldn't just step off the curb into traffic without looking). You should understand that, if the pilot doesn't know where the other airplanes are, you might hit one, would be bad because don't fly after that, need separation.

Keep in mind that there is nobody in the FAA that will admit a problem with any of the way things are (which is the problem).

"Radar" is the only collision avoidance system technology that there is. There is absolutely no other technology which can provide collision avoidance between airplanes. It works different than you think.

It must have a transponder (TRANSmitting resPONDER) in the aircraft. Something interrogates the transponder, and the transponder responds with an answer. If the transponder doesn't answer, then the target does not show up on that something ("radar" sensor). There is an additional problem where the "radar" sensor knows of the target, but that never gets posted to the display of targets. That last part is a ground equipment problem (it's built wrong too).

We can solve both problems when we solve the air equipment problem.

Let's investigate the transponder side of the equation in detail:

The interrogation contains four bursts of radio frequency energy, that we call pulses. P1 is the reference pulse, and the action commands for the transponder come from additional pulses timed from P1 of the interrogation.

At two microseconds after P1 was P2, and the command was "do not respond". If you don't hear it, continue the process. If you do hear it, stop here and shut down the transmitter for a long time. The reason for this was to stop replies to interrogations that came out the side and back lobes of the ground "radar" antenna. This P2 pulse was called SLS, for side lobe suppression. It is absolutely necessary to continue this, even though the FAA dropped it from the spec (TSO - Technical Standards Order, C74c), to prevent "phantoms", which are non-existent aircraft, from showing up on the "radar".

If you didn't hear P2, then look for P3. If eight microseconds (six microseconds after the P2 that wasn't there) reply with an identity dialed into the face of the avionics. One type of reply - name. If twenty one microseconds (nineteen microseconds after the P2 that wasn't there) reply with altitude. The only other type of reply - height.

There were no other combinations contained in TSO C74c, dated 1/26/73.

The FAA changed the TSO specification to include another P nearer P3. A new P never before seen, which none of all of the equipment in the air and none of all of the equipment on the ground then was designed to know about, that always happens two microseconds after P3 (either ten or twenty three microseconds after P1, one or the other). Ps were, before, numbered in the order which they occur, so, this would be called P4. The FAA created an entirely new specification, designated C74c, to replace the old specification, designated C74c, where the suppression command is switched from P2 to this new pulse, which will be called P2. There is no longer a mention of suppression on the old P2, just that P4 should be called P2 and is the new suppression command, and occurs nearest P3.

No mention was made about removing all of the transponders from aircraft that are C74c compliant but are not C74c compliant (continue to suppress on P2 just after P1, but not on P2 just after P3 which is P4). They are still flying.

No mention was made about removing all of the old "radars" from the airports that issue a C74c compliant interrogation but did not issue a C74c compliant interrogation (continue to expect suppression on P2 just after P1, not on P2 just after P3 which is P4 because they don't make a P4 new P2).

All of the old stuff is still out (up and down) there. New and old transponders and radars are mutually exclusive in their specified operations, and in their specified interoperabilities.

Multiple ways to prove that the FAA is technically incompetent (a case study):

The first is "how do the existing transponders in aircraft really work, the most of the ones that are still up there". To minimize transistors (these were designed before integrated circuits), have a circuit that says "if you ever hear two pulses two microseconds apart, shut down the transmitter for a long time. Does that do it for you? Many old transponders suppress to new radars (always hear the P3-P4 pulse pair, comply to the new C74c). All the new ones do the same. Does that do it for you?

Well, if not, consider, maybe, that the intended purpose of the P4 named P2 was that the ATCRBS transponder was supposed to ignore it!  That was what is necessary for the ATC system to continue to work right! That is opposite to the specification. Would that do it for you?

The second is to look at the standards published by the FAA:

Trans. 28 (Amdt. 37-35, Eff. 1/26/73) $37.180 Airborne ATC Transponder Equipment-TSO-C74c. 2.0 Minimum Performance Standards Under Standard Conditions. 2.6 Decoding Performance. C. Side Lobe Suppression.

The transponder must be suppressed for a period of 35 +/- 10 microseconds following receipt of a pulse pair of proper spacing and amplitude indicative of side lobe suppression. This suppression action must be capable of being reinitiated for the full duration within 2 microseconds after the end of any suppression period. The transponder must be suppressed with a 99 percent efficiency over a received signal amplitude range between 3 db above minimum triggering level and 50 db above that level and upon receipt of properly spaced interrogations when the received amplitude of P2 is equal to or in excess of the received amplitude of P1 and spaced 2.0 +/- 0.15 microsecond from P1.

Apparently, the FAA thought that they had made a serious specification error. Contrast the above with TSO-C74c, Airborne ATC Transponder Equipment, 2/20/73, 2.6 Decoding Performance, c. Side-lobe Suppression (http://www.faa.gov/avr/air/AIR100/tsocur/C74c.doc search on "c.  Side-lobe Suppression").

The transponder must be suppressed for a period of 35 +/- 10 microseconds following receipt of a pulse pair of proper spacing and suppression action must be capable of being reinitiated for the full duration within 2 microseconds after the end of any suppression period. The transponder must be suppressed with a 99 percent efficiency over a received signal amplitude range between 3 db above minimum triggering level and 50 db above that level and upon receipt of properly spaced interrogations when the received amplitude of P2 is equal to or in excess of the received amplitude of P1 and spaced 2.0 +/- 0.15 microsecond from P3.

See the difference? Did the FAA intentionally change the technical requirements without requiring old equipment to be retired (which would be incompetent), or did they unintentionally change the technical operation requirements without knowing it (which would be incompetent)? Where is suppression to be done? Did it change? What is P4 (nearest P3) supposed to do? Did the former function of P2 change? Should the old ones be pulled out of airplanes? Do you need new ground "radars"? They are trying to figure this out in Helsinki, but not in the United States. Shouldn't they here, too? Should you change the number (C74d) when you change the technical content of the spec? Wouldn't keeping the same designator for a completely new function operation specification be incompetent?

Does that do it for you?

Would you believe this, the correct answer is: The transponder must be suppressed for a period of 35 +/- 10 microseconds following receipt of a pulse pair of proper spacing and suppression action must be capable of being reinitiated for the full duration within 2 microseconds after the end of any suppression period. The transponder must be suppressed with no more than a 1 percent efficiency over a received signal amplitude range between 3 db above minimum triggering level and 50 db above that level and upon receipt of properly spaced interrogations when the received amplitude of P2 is equal to or in excess of the received amplitude of P1 and spaced 2.0 +/- 0.15 microsecond from P3.

Does that do it for you?

If you really want to conduct independent research, and if you are a technician, then go to any avionics shop and borrow an FAA certified "repair manual" on any transponder make and model. Read the "theory of operation" part - it's usually less than 10 pages long (these are not complicated electronic devices). See where they all say suppress on P1-P2, where P2 is two microseconds after P1?  See where they all say nothing about any P4?

Does that do it for you?

The third is to see what happened to companies that designed transponders that followed the new rules since the new rules (compliant with C74c 2/20/73).

Terra was identified by the FAA first. In fact, the FAA calls the failure to respond to an interrogation containing P3-P4 as "the Terra problem"! Does that do it for you (the "Terra Problem" is the new C74c compliance)?

The Terra transponder did suppress on receipt of P3-P4. Terra is no more. What was left, after FAA enforcement, was bought by Trimble for their avionics division. There is no more Trimble avionics division. Is this the reason, or part of the reason? Does the FAA even care enough to find out? Does that do it for you?

Narco was identified by the FAA. Narco designed the AT-150 to replace the older AT-50 and AT-50A. In fact, the FAA found early AT-150s that suffered the failure to respond to an interrogation containing P3-P4 (complies with the newer C74c spec). The Narco design did suppress on receipt of P3-P4 (any two pulses 2 microseconds apart), which upsets the FAA today. Does that do it for you? Narco added Q415 and R508, which are not documented in the AT-150 Maintenance Manual you will find in the avionics shops that service these transponders, and connected them such as to "short out the receiver" during the time that P4 would come along. Eliminates P3-P4 because never sees the P4 pulse. Make it as if the FAA never authorized the P4 transmission in the interrogation. Does that do it for you?

King was identified by the FAA. The airborne "radar" is called TCAS, and only interrogates for altitude information, and not for identity information (because identity is not necessary for the provision of collision avoidance services). The King KT-76 mark was identified as not replying with data to altitude interrogations. The FAA AD (airworthiness directive) states that resistors needed to be replaced to fix this this "dataless" altitude reply. Read the AD, does that do it for you?

These resistors either duplicate the identical function provided in the encoder, or don't have anything to do with the provision of altitude data within the reply. Does that do it for you? If the altitude data resistor failed open, the duplicate function in the encoder would solve the problem (redundancy). If the altitude data resistor failed short, the problem would be wrong altitude data, would not be no altitude data. Does that do it for you? If the non-altitude resistors failed open or short, that also would not create an altitude data reply without data. The AD does not address the part of the circuit that is responsible for the function deviation that the FAA says is the problem!  Does that do it for you?

Did these companies do the right thing when they did what was specified in the spec? Should they have "do what we want, not what we say" (is that the purpose of a spec, how should you know what is right) or should they have "do what we say" (which is what they did, and why they are in trouble)?

How far do we have to go yet?

The fourth is to show you that the FAA seems to be a dishonest standards setting body; and it is up to you to define if we need one of those. It seems that it knows it has done wrong, and it seems that it will protect itself at all costs. Is this organization, behaving this way, of any benefit to society?

How to explain that they probably know about, not only the lowest level of air safety ever experienced, but that their existence probably poses a credible threat to your life? Try this. Keep in mind that there is nobody in the FAA that can admit to having found a problem:

Suppose you have an FAA Air Traffic Controller, and he admits almost causing a mid-air collision (before the FAA just recently finally first started to attempt to accurately measure). Suppose that it's not anything he did wrong - he had followed procedure, he did the right stuff, the equipment wasn't operating abnormally, nothing was (except for design) broken. Suppose that the two airplanes missed eachother by pure chance. Suppose that it happened because, he never saw one of them on the ATC scope.

Do you understand, yet, that that is where we are?

Suppose that he studied and found out why that happened, and he wants to publish. After all, the only way to fix a problem is to first admit that there is a problem, right?

If you have studied taillight, then you know how the FAA never even required avionics shops to have transponder test equipment that issued a P0 in the bench test interrogation (transponders, during the biennial "alignment" are never actually fired by an interrogation preceded by a noise pulse, like they must be assured to fire). And you know how the FAA changed the specification for suppression, and how that causes the poor equipment used by ATC to see phantom airplanes that are not really there. And you know how the FAA, in the process, added a new P4, but do you know what it is supposed to do? And you know that is causing the poor equipment used by ATC to not see airplanes that are really there. Same thing with the airborne TCAS, but a much more thorough elimination of warnings about aircraft that are really there. You should be asking your elected government officials why the mis-specification is not corrected. You should be asking your elected government officials why the fix (transponder repair that we have, that eliminates all of these problems) is not immediately authorized. You should be asking your elected officials what the FAA priority is, and why they are not interceding to elevate it.

Suppose it is because doing that would cause a legal admission of guilt for all of the mid-air collisions that have happened during the last almost 30 years since the second C74c. Suppose it is because doing that would cause an admission of not knowing what you are doing, setting standards, asking the world to blindly follow those standards, for the last almost 30 years. You can't do that, can you? So, what is the alternative?

Suppose you write a letter, on official FAA stationary, to your miscreant FAA controller, who almost killed plane loads of real people because his Air Traffic Control equipment, the only thing that we have for collision avoidance, doesn't work right, and both he and you know this: "As a result of my review, as well as discussions with the (deleted to avoid lawsuit) Center Air Traffic Manager, Assistant Manager for Automation and Airways Facilities System Engineers, it would seem that much of the information upon which your presentation is based is "non-public information" and as such is prohibited by 49 CFR 99.735-11(c). I would also direct you to Executive Order 11222. Under that order Federal employees are to avoid any action which might result in adversely affecting the confidence of the public in the integrity of the Government."

Catch that, if you tell what you know, we will throw you in jail, where you will be used as a sexual object by your large roommate? Is that not totally incompetent? Is an agency acting this way of any value to society?

Does it look like we are there yet?

The fifth is to show you what we discovered is the process, after we approached the ATCRBS transponder manufacturers with "Lookiewhatwegots", "Youwannagetridda"?

Once we worked with the engineers at one, to design a new ATCRBS transponder that actually works (you wouldn't believe how far out on "radar" it shows up, you wouldn't believe how "ring around the airport" just goes entirely away, you wouldn't believe how well it shows to TCAS equipment, you wouldn't believe the reliability increase), we discovered that we have the following problem: How to get the FAA to allow them to build. Remember, if you are compliant to the TSO, it won't work, and you should be killed for making something that don't work; but, if you violate the TSO compliance (what you build works), you should be killed for non-compliance with the standard.  Are you confused, or does that do it for you?

I think this is:  We, like the Catholic church once did, will render to you an indulgence. You don't have to comply with the standard, just say you do. In other words, you don't need to follow the rules of God, if you give consideration. Should we tolerate that in an FAA?

Do you see the value of that "C74c compliance" sticker on the rear of the transponder? Do you know which different operation you are getting?

Do we have a whole lot to go yet?

The sixth is, how about, wasn't the FAA created to eliminate, and to not certify, single point failures in airplane designs?

  The FAA is the only agency looking out for you 

But one example of a single point failure as a key critical part of an airplane control system design.  You know, if you absolutely positively have to have one or you die, then you get just only one, with absolutely positively nothing to back it up when it fails.  NASA calls that concept "non-man rated" and will not let it off the ground with people in it.  This shaft (jackscrew) is the one and only attitude control actuator mechanism on the aircraft (up-down control).  Those thread shards are what is left of the inside of the articulating gimbal mounted single nut attached to the elevator/horizontal stabilizer (now free to flap about and gyrate the airplane randomly up and down).  Everybody died on this airplane.  There were inspections fleet wide of this type, ordered by the FAA, and there were a whole lot more airplanes found just ready to fail in the same way (search on jackscrew).

That possibly yet do it for you?

Did the FAA allow the design of a passenger jet, which must be assured to have no single point failure in its control system, to operate for decades on many airlines world wide with that single point failure in the control system? Wouldn't that be incompetent? Did the FAA, who is responsible to assure the aircraft will have no single point failure in its control system, not even check? Wouldn't that be incompetent? Did the FAA, after the plane crashed, discover that there was no certification, and all of the FAA Airworthiness Inspectors have been missing that for decades? Wouldn't that be just plain incapable of serving the public interest on both the engineering certification and on the paperwork inspection fronts? Did the FAA, after the plane crashed, maybe, did they, shred the evidence of that single point failure certification? Wouldn't that be just plain crooked?

When the FAA finally discovered that they violated even the most common sense tenants of safety, what did they do? Should you be asking your elected government representatives where did it go?

Is this agency of any value to society?  Where?

The seventh is, what do you suppose the FAA would do if you created a business and expended resources to try to fix one of these kinds of FAA created problems?

Take the example of, you probably wouldn't remember generators, because cars have replaced them with alternators; starting about 40 years ago. Because alternators are more reliable than generators. Only airplanes still have generators, with their limited output ability and their brush and commutator maintenance problems, and their sudden failures! Let's take Alaska, where, if it doesn't work reliably then you die, because airplanes and dog sleds are about the only way to get around.

Let's suppose you have certified your alternator design with the FAA for airplanes manufactured in Kerrville Texas (you wouldn't believe how arduous the path that you have successfully negotiated), and also have field approvals from the FAA field office in Alaska for use in other airplanes. In other words, everybody knows how good you are, because they asked for other airplanes and the FAA said OK. Your design is proven, witness the TC for Mooney, and your design is highly reliable, witness the various field approvals from the FAA for other airplanes in Alaska that also want your stuff, and the demand for more based on word of mouth.

Why, the FAA, central, in Washington D.C., where they all live in an office building at 800 Independence Avenue SW, where they most just about all don't know how to fly, should descend upon you with the entire weight of the federal government, and try their very best to put you out of business.

Does that do it for you?

The eighth is my favorite: If the given is, and it is without certification of what you have been reading about on taillight (the world's only demonstrated collision avoidance system that works everywhere now and for the "density" of airplanes there are), can't determine position sufficiently well to provide separation, what do you do to prevent collisions?

Here is one FAA answer, if the demand is for use of more airplanes, because there isn't enough airplanes to handle the transportation demand of the economy: Reduce the number of airplanes instead of fixing the problem requiring the reduction in number of airplanes.

Here is the other FAA answer, if the problem is airplanes are packed too close together, pack them in closer to eachother (search for "RVSM").

Does that do it for you?

The ninth is a dead give away, if you can think (you don't even have to know aviation procedure or technical minutia): The FAA says that there aren't enough radio frequencies. Needs more frequencies to talk to airplanes, 760 isn't enough. Nothing but solid garble on each, what with everybody talking all of the time. Can't control anything that way - can't get through. And that is why the FAA shouldn't be held responsible to provide separation.

You can't fly from where you are to where you want to go. You go merge onto a highway in the sky, where you get up close and personal with all the other airplanes. The only way to know about the other airplanes around you, so you don't run into one, is to talk to this poor overworked "radar" controller, whose display has airplanes that aren't there just popping up, and doesn't have airplanes that are there, and doesn't show the airplanes where they really are (every "radar" says different). There is a lot of hollering and screaming (harried communications) over the radio. What do people say - a picture (in the cockpit) is worth a thousand words (of communication with each and every airplane about the same things)?

This is what we have which totally works: Cessna RT-359A aircraft (one example of) transponder modification (left), a cockpit terrain and obstruction and collision avoidance display (right), a runway incursion display (bottom) - click on these and use save to desktop:

Are we there yet?

The purpose of this is to show you that the FAA is technically incompetent, and to show you why there is a problem that endangers your life significantly if you board an airplane or live under one. You should now understand the problem. Deal with it.

"It's an acronysm. Two definitions. It has long ago totally and completely outlived any utility that it once had to society. Each letter of the mnemonic stands for the first letter of a word (Feckless Aviation Aberration)."
--B. Keith Peshak