http://www.ion.org/meetings/am2002program.cfm
Lead paper
Session B2: Surveying, Geodesy, and Mapping
8:30 a.m. - noon, Ballroom B
ION 58th Annual Meeting and the CIGTF 21st Guidance Test Symposium
June 24-26, 2002
The paper stresses that on February 20th, 1973 the FAA issued a new
Technical Standards Order, C74c, for aircraft transponder design in which
14 of the 16 possible transponder interrogations and the response that
the transponder must produce are mis-specified, and we state specifically
some of the logical errors. Of course, if the transponder doesn't
work right, then "radar" cannot "see" the airplane effectively (we predicted
the below stated).
So the TailLight Consortium provides complete equipment that works,
also OEM "boards" to avionics manufacturers, also "chips" to avionics manufacturers;
which solve the Air Traffic Control and collision avoidance ensuing disasters
created by and held secret by the FAA.
The paper is available from the Institute of Navigation, http://www.ion.org
Abstract
For courtesy, a complete copy can be downloaded:
For
Word for Windows 95, 53248 bytes without graphics
For
Word for Windows 97, 633856 bytes with graphics
A final
surprise that we had not expected.
Toldjaso (a TCAS induced midair)
Toldjawhy (1030 MHz and 1090 MHz unnecessary "noise")
Toldjawould (a giant airplane stuffed with 45 children)
http://www.avweb.com/newswire/news0227b.html#2
A midair collision at 36,000 feet between a Bashkirian Airlines Tupolev
TU-154 and a Boeing 757 DHL cargo jet on Monday, July 1st, 2002, killed
all 71 aboard both aircraft, including dozens of Russian schoolchildren
on a vacation trip. The aircraft were in Swiss-controlled airspace.
Early reports from the Swiss said the Tupolev crew had failed to respond
to warnings to descend, but the Russians disputed that, and yesterday the
Tupolev's flight recorder confirmed that the crew responded within 25 seconds
to the ATC warning. The Swiss said an ATC collision-avoidance system
had been turned off for routine maintenance, and one of the two controllers
on duty had been on a break. The weather was clear and traffic in
the sector was light when the airplanes collided near midnight local time.
As of yesterday, July 2nd, 2002, afternoon, it was being reported that
the 757 crew descended in response to a TCAS warning, and the Russian pilots
descended after being directed to do so by ATC only 50 seconds before the
collision. The TU-154 also reportedly had TCAS on board. Besides
the scrutiny sure to follow for ATC procedures and TCAS technology, the
accident brought critics of the Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM)
initiative scurrying to the stage for an opportunity to express their viewpoint.
RVSM, which cut the minimum vertical separation requirement between aircraft
above FL290 from 2,000 feet to 1,000, was instated in 41 European and North
African countries less than six months ago. RVSM was implemented
to increase airspace capacity, and it does, essentially doubling the number
of flight levels between 29,000 and 41,000 feet. However, it's controversial
for a number of reasons, and critics often question the safety of the reduced
standards in spite of the more accurate positioning equipment required
to access flight levels subject to RVSM. The program is slated for
introduction in the U.S. by the end of 2004. Voice and data recorders
from both planes were being examined yesterday, July 2nd, 2002. The
NTSB sent a team to aid in the investigation.
Here is an MIT-LL/RTCA question for you (the people that the FAA
wants to do all of their thinking for them): If the TCAS interrogates
once per second, and hears the whole world (that could be interrogated
from a jillion ground radars and all the other TCAS up there), how does
it figure out, for an absolute certainty, if that reply it got was to it,
or something else (in which case you can't trust range or identity or altitude
therefrom derived)? Obviously, "Germany" and Swiss ATC proved the
answer!
Are you next? Look out the window, can you tell what type
of airplane? (If you can, that was a near midair, by FAA definition
of the technical term.) ATC can't handle 3000 airplanes nationwide.
TailLight can handle the traffic if there were an airvehicle for every
automobile nationwide. Plus, of course, TailLight fixes "radar" (dropout,
coast mode, track jump all go away).
Because FAA TSO C74c is wrong
A typical
feedback that we have gotten from previous papers and demonstrations.
Even ATC pilots have done detailed
investigations in this specific matter.
Web page for the only
solution that works
Complaints
we usually get from the FAA
Comparison
with closest technology competitor
Detailed
technical info at the TailLight research page
An
interim EMERGENCY aid
