When you get on an airplane, there is no reasonable assurance that you
will not be hit by another airplane.
The only thing keeping that from happening most of the time is that
it is a big sky and there are very few airplanes.
This is a problem easily solved.
What is AIS-P?
This solution is the only one which is safe and effective. It
is also low cost.
The only impediment to implementation is the FAA
On September 11th, 2001 the President grounded all aviation in the entire country
We need a system for collision avoidance. ADS-B would have the President broadcast his exact position, exact movements, flight plans, and times of arrival at locations, along with his identity. His advisor was worried that a weapon with his name on it would avoid all of the screening F-16s, whose job is to get in the way, maneuvering around them to get him. To preclude anybody from attacking him, all other aviation had to stop in the entire country. ADS-B will make it much easier for the two appointed generals, or anybody else, to shoot down a named target, built from parts available at a Radio Shack. We have a better solution.
Transponders, ATCRBS, TCAS, ADS-B, Mode S in Aviation
This is the only known solution for FAA myatonia has forced us into the worst air traffic delays ever experienced at the same time that we suffer the lowest level of air safety ever experienced. You can't fix something until you understand that you have a problem. Once you understand the problem, if you are from the computer architecture and integrated circuit design arena, the solution presents itself. This is the only solution that is dual redundant. This solution has ~1,000,000 times the NAS capacity of its competition (ADS-B on VDL mode 4). This is the only solution that does not present a significant terrorist threat. This is the only solution that only costs about $1000/airplane for minimum compliance. This solution is light years beyond FAA comprehension.Introduction to Aircraft Collision Avoidance Transponders (the only thing we have)The technical solution to all of the problems with air traffic control, which is there purely for collision avoidance, is simple, as is proven on this page. The cost is low, at about $1000/aircraft for minimum compliance, as is proven on this page. We get many times the NAS capacity of all other proposed competitive systems. The only remaining problem seems to be that the FAA will not allow modern technology into aircraft, as they, apparently, fear this a threat to their $13.57 billion per year budget which is used to employ ~20,000 people for their system of collision avoidance that guarantees no separation to any VFR containing combination, and has trouble providing IFR-IFR separation to ~3,000 aircraft nationwide. We suggest combining the two, for the world's first collision avoidance system with redundancy (two independent systems). We do this, of course, totally without also introducing a threat to any aircraft from attack. Unlike ADS-B, we thought that should be a requirement for any system for collision avoidance, so that is where we started, rather than having to try to add it now.
This site presents technology and images of and from actual operating equipment. Screen captures take a long time to download through a telephone line. You may have to right click on any image that times out (shows a box with an "X").
The transponder in your plane is the only avionics that there is for collision avoidance. If compliant with the FAA Technical Standards Order C74c for transponders, then it does not work correctly. Even when it does work correctly, because the transponder design has been rendered non compliant, the FAA ground equipment also has basic design deficiency problems. Here is an introductory overview of the combined issues: Radar for the non engineer
The FAA Created Problems Set (agency technical competence)
The major problems with aircraft transponders not replying to interrogations (showing up on "radar") is the mal-adjustment of the alternate digital interrogation data detector in the case of the P0 pulse (because the FAA requires no equipment to allow correctly adjusting this), and the new command to suppress in the case of the P4 pulse (because of the FAA transponder improper redesign).Nicholas Talotta of the FAA's William J. Hughes Technical Center in Atlantic City, New Jersey, went to Oshkosh and Sun 'n Fun (general aviation gatherings) with actual test equipment (something that the FAA doesn't do). He checked transponders inside of general aviation airplanes with pilot permission and found that only 4% (four percent) work correctly. Here is the FAA official report on transponders don't work right: tn97_7.pdf
What the problem set is.
A government command, called an Airworthiness Directive, from the FAA, which is an order to fix a transponder. Notice that the "repair" addresses a part of the transponder which can not be responsible for the stated problem (edited to include engineering data).
Tom Lusch was an FAA "radar" center controller, and is a pilot. He has posted some startling findings on his web site as concerns his investigations about Transponders Becoming Invisible
If the "equipment in the airplane is all broken" wasn't bad enough, if the FAA somehow gets an interrogation through to your transponder without other radar and TCAS and TCAD interrogations stepping on it, if the transponder actually replies through all of the P0 confusing noise and P4 "do not reply" commands to it, if that transponder reply data representing your airplane actually gets back to the "radar" without other transponder replies to other interrogations, or ADS-B incessant blabbering, stepping on it, then the FAA "radar" has a high probability of just throwing away that critical reply (not displaying your aircraft to the controller responsible for collision avoidance, such as it is).
A simple slide show that explains that the "FAA equipment on the ground is also all broken".
Please pay particular attention to slide 33. True life example.
The FAA's Response to their Problems when provided a Solution
Thomas E. McSweeny, the Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification, writes that there is no such problem. Consider this his report card on how well he is serving us, since our lives are at stake (this is the only collision avoidance system that there is). Of course, we sent an answer but we never got anything else from him.
Contrary to what you would think, if you believe McSweeny, the FAA does know that there is a problem. They put together a blue ribbon commission to deal with it. The minutes of a meeting with the FAA on their (at that time) admitted transponder problem.AEA is a "three letter group" ostensibly created to help aviation. This is an example of their help, a report (edited to include engineering data) in an effort to save aircraft owners something.
The FAA has a solution for all of this. It is expensive. It requires much new government (equipment and people). It doesn't cover all aircraft. It doesn't work everywhere. It introduces a whole new set of problems. It's name is ADS-B
The Right Solution to the Problems (fix FAA created problems, then add redundancy)
There is a right way to provide collision avoidance, and it is free when included with the transponder P0 and P4 FAA caused problems fix. The whole thing is inexpensive, at about $1000 per airplane. This whole repair requires no new government (equipment or people). Everything fixed for all aircraft, and it works everywhere, all of the time. This uses GNSS or Loran-C to simply say your aircraft position and velocity. It is called AIS-P.We have petitioned the FAA to request of ICAO to assign an available downlink format number so that the world can use this technology inside the existing transponder in complete compliance with the world transponder operations standard. After a year and a half of no response, we finally get one. Of course, this stops an FAA certification program, because, legally, there is no way of operating, without the downlink format number being assigned. We have requested a temporary DFN assignment for a duration of one year, to allow a testing program. Nothing to report, we are being ignored by the FAA.
Here is a letter from a former (now retired) FAA radar technical expert
This is what AIS-P looks like inside a Cessna RT-359A (left), a Narco AT-150 (next right), a King KT-76A (last) transponders:
![]()
![]()
![]()
One 2" x 2" board, one FPGA, and a few components and wires
mounted inside any existing transponderWe have eliminated two things from these transponders:
1. The need to "tune" every two years (FAA wants, now, every three months if you carry passengers).
The "biennial".
2. A few components
(Narco AT-150 conversion example)
(Cessna RT-359A conversion example)Engineering Test Results
1. The FAA won't even look at it; so says Ann Harlan, head of the William J. Hughes Technical Center in her e-mail.
2. We take engineering measurement data.
International Reviewed Published Papers (reverse chronological order)
Here is the latest scientifically reviewed paper on the subject before The 58th Annual Meeting and the CIGTF 21st Guidance Test Symposium of The Institute of Navigation in their Conference Proceedings for Spring 2002: ION
Here is an older scientifically reviewed paper on the subject before The 46th Annual Air Traffic Control Association in their Conference Proceedings for Fall 2001, except it is too hot for them to handle, even though they find no technical fault: ATApaper2
Here is an older scientifically reviewed paper on the subject before The 7th International Symposium on GPS/GNSS Workshop: KoreanPaper
Here is an older scientifically reviewed paper on the subject before The 45th Annual Air Traffic Control Association in their Conference Proceedings for Fall 2000. Library of Congress Control Card Number 79-643160. ISSN 0192-8740: ATA paper.
Here is an older scientifically reviewed paper on the subject before The German Institute of Navigation at the International Symposium on Integration of LORAN-C/EUROFIX and EGNOS/Galileo: GIN paper.
Here is an older scientifically reviewed paper on the subject before The Royal Institute of Navigation at NAV99/ILA28, session 10: RIN paper and the overhead foils for that paper: RIN foils.
Here is a listing of EAA audio tapes of popular lectures delivered over a three year period. These have been canceled by EAA executive order, so can not be offered this year.
The Second (added almost free, redundant) Collision Avoidance System
This is what the AIS-P TailLight receiver panel mount avionics looks like, a box the size of a transponder:
That price is ~$5000, and the box takes up panel space, and there are controls to fiddle with.
We eliminated the fiddling with controls, put it in a box the size of a "blind encoder" which you can mount anywhere (preferably next to the antenna), and reduced the price to ~$500. This produces about a 30 mile target range on a common transponder antenna.
What comes out of it depends on what display unit you use, and what display software you want. If you weren't aware of it, all of the new fangled ~$15k glass cockpit displays are old IBM compatible PCs.
Here we have an example of free software adopted from the radio amateur APRS project, operating on a $250 used 600x800 laptop PC (any PC platform will work), to, at this level of "zoom", solve the airport runway incursion avoidance problem. This is supposed to be an FAA priority (FAA doesn't know what to do, except to blame the little planes for everybody's almost kills).
There is only one thing keeping you from having this technology today: the FAA.
The aircraft is where the pressure altitude (number) block is. The triangle, called a "Bob Collins box", in honor of a well known and respected Chicago radio personality and aviator, who died while correctly following FAA commands as to which direction he must fly his aircraft while in the airport traffic pattern, sweep outward to indicate aircraft direction. It runs out to a stop line where the aircraft will be in a minute. If two boxes touch, (the computer catches itself painting a pixel green twice) the radar controller is warned and has a full minute to clear the collision. This about $1500 complete "radar" (if you don't need to upgrade your cockpit display device to run Delorme Street Atlas) provides service even the FAA can't with their ASR radar costing $2,000,000 each. Only this one includes runway incursion warnings (no other equipment exists to provide this service).
This is also useful for guiding lost skudrunners into a general aviation airport by talking over unicom. Also for a "talk down ASR" approach over the unicom (like the military used to do for GA) for 0,0 when the FAA refuses entry into the ILS equipped local "big" airport (better than holding until you are out of fuel). And advisories over unicom that include traffic position. Just doing more than ATC can and better.
Below is the about $1500 moving map version, which is the same (just "zoom" out). If you want, it also has your pressure altitude data block in the exact center of the screen. The map moves as you fly. If you want, you can turn on a series of one mile range circles. This is useful for guiding yourself in a "see yourself down" approach, flying a fire bomber where the smoke is so thick that you can't see the target area or the other bombers flying in formation with you to establish a fire line, and just the normal cross country where you want a pair of electronic eyes watching for traffic.
There is only one thing keeping you from having this technology today: the FAA.
Maybe you or your targets in the area go faster, so you need more warning. Just "zoom" out more.
The above two are produced at about the size of the $12,500 Garmin 530 dashboard display.
The below are produced at the 600x800 (small) size of an old IBM equivalent $250 used laptop.There is only one thing keeping you from having this technology today: the FAA.
Remember, what comes out of it depends on what display unit you use, and what display software you want. Remember, all of the new fangled ~$15k glass cockpit displays are just old IBM compatible PCs anyway.
Since we have, obviously, solved the collision avoidance problem, we turn our attention to CFIT. April 3rd, 1996, Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown found out what that is, aboard a Boeing CT-42A near Dubrovnik. 1995 American Airlines 965 at Calle, 1996 Faucett 251 at Arequipa, 1997 Korean Air 801 at Guam; 40% of all aviation fatalities. Add more to the database in the PC.
These are reduced image examples of software (this vendor wants money), operating on a $250 used laptop PC (and any PC platform will work) that gives you sectional type charts, along with traffic, terrain and obstruction avoidance. Just click on an image for the full 600x800 size presentation.
There is only one thing keeping you from having this technology today: the FAA.
The terrain avoidance window, at the lower right, just like the other windows, can be turned on and off, and placed and sized how you want (if you don't like this arrangement). We selected user setable color transitions at 500 feet and 1000 feet (because here is flat), but you can set them for the altitude differences that you like. The obstruction avoidance numbers on the towers are clearance to the bottom of the aircraft (watch out for small negative through positive numbers). All of this is taken from the electronic chart.
This example of a collision display doesn't have the altitude boxes for the other aircraft, but chose rather to use colored symbols, like green (lower), blue (higher), or surrounded in red (near your altitude). The airplane is at the forward pointy end of the direction pointing icon. There are "wake up" bars at the bottom with warnings (which should probably also include intruder). Audio stating into the headset the words "traffic" with direction and distance and altitude difference and if climbing/descending and time to impact (you are not bothered if impact isn't a factor) would not be difficult.
There is only one thing keeping you from having this technology today: the FAA.
To assure comfort for those (FAA) that insist on the accuracy of the standard Sectional Aeronautical Chart,
please note the electronic fold in the electronic chart, right where it should be (near the top, above, in this case); which might should be removed.
An Invitation
To any aviation administration, worldwide that is a member of ICAO:We have a problem in the United States. Our only collision avoidance system for civil and military aircraft is based on the "transponder" (transmitting responder). A "radar" on the ground, or in the air, sends out an interrogation signal on 1030 MHz, and the aircraft sends reply altitude data on 1090 MHz. Our regulatory agency, the FAA, has "improved" upon the concept to the point that it no longer works reliably, doesn't work at all if built as specified. As a result, we have the worst air traffic delays ever experienced, coupled with the lowest level of air safety ever experienced, while we fly limited to only the "highways in the sky" where airplanes are intentionally crowded together, and a regulatory agency that appears to prefer to cover up the deficiencies in both the system and equipment we have.
We need a solution, and this isn't a difficult technical problem. We decided to use satellite navigation signals (Glonass, Galileo, GPS until the others are completely fielded) and/or ground based navigation signals (Loran-C) to simply allow the transponder to just say where the airplane is. A Mode S, existing international standard, 64 microsecond message, downlink format number 11111, which states position (latitude and longitude and altitude) and velocity (direction and speed), is transmitted along with the "normal" transponder reply stream, but at a much reduced rate. Any "radar" could simply listen, and build a display from the received positional information messages from targets. Gone is the necessity for big expensive directional antennas, powerful expensive analysis computers, powerful expensive transmitters, ... This new system, or existing system augmentation, can be produced for orders of magnitude less than the FAA ASR, TCAS, or competing proposals such as ADS-B (which don't seem to be up to the job). And this new technology does not have the fundamental architectural deficiencies that cannot be removed from that old and the proposed new technology. The transponder circuitry is a simple repair to the existing aircraft transponder.
This is not theory - it works, as you can see for yourself. There is only one thing keeping you from having this technology today: the FAA.
Our problem is that our regulatory agency of our government is in direct opposition to this technology, even though it wishes to publicly appear supportive (http://www.avweb.com/oshkosh/osh99/ click on "Meet The Boss" session with FAA Administrator Garvey and move the slide bar to 41 minutes [these are hollow words with no follow-up behind them]). My government has done nothing in many many many years that is in any way helpful, they have done much which is distracting and of great expense to anyone proposing a solution to this problem. Mostly, what we get is, long periods of many months totally without any form of communication. When we inquire, all we get is "working on it". Nobody knows doing what.
Your country could apply to ICAO, the International Civil Aviation Organization, for inclusion into the existing international standard, called the Mode S transponder standard, a now vacant assignment of "downlink format number 11111" to the data packet that we defined. The request should be made to jhowell@icao.int. Your country could simply just go ahead and implement this technology (then, we could import it).
We can supply the equipment necessary to provide collision avoidance for air travel in your country, and for the world, which is far superior to what can be obtained at any cost today, and do that for about $1000 per airplane for the transponder modification, about $500 more for a complete aircraft "radar" to see the other aircraft, and about $500 for a ground "radar" to see the aircraft around and on an airport. We would help your people to design, to manufacture, we would supply the technology and training and critical componentry, and then import.
Your country has the standing before ICAO to make this request, something that my country will not do, something that I am not allowed to do. Your country has the scientific understanding to allow safer air travel worldwide, something that my country will not do.
What my country has is a $13.6 billion/year bureaucracy built only to service about 3,000 aircraft, of the about 220,000 aircraft operating in my country, at the public expense for money and lower level of safety.
Additional Information about the FAA
To help understand my government, an article about the politics of governmental regulatory agencies. This is a powerful article on the FAA and the FDA. Here is an excerpt: "As I write these words, there is a situation where the FAA has been made aware of science that explains why their radar systems too often don't work ... personalities and protection of careers are more persuasive than a value of the public trust. In the mean time, the taxpaying public believes the rhetoric found in every speech by an FAA official claiming to have public safety uppermost in their minds." See the entire article for yourself.Another technical dimension to the FAA.
This is the way my standards organization acts. Are you being lied to by the government? Think for yourself.
Jane on this Subject
Jane Garvey says that "This technology has the potential of filling in huge gaps in radar coverage". That has to be the grossest understatement of the year. When the FAA has "improved" the Technical Standards Order for "radar" to the extent that, when a transponder is C74c compliant, then it does not work right, like not showing on TCAS for instance because it suppresses on P3 and P4, of course there are going to be huge gaps. Why the TCAs are expanding (Minnesota will be the test, if successful all others follow). Why the only way to guarantee separation is each airplane at different altitude, which means you need more altitudes, which you get by packing them in closer to eachother with Reduced Vertical Separation Minima (search on RVSM expansion in New York). There are capacity problems, which leads to delays and lower level of safety. Don't worry, even ATC, and their ATCA, knows it isn't safe. But what do we do?
Jane says this technology will solve the problem. But she doesn't like the "about $1500 per airplane" part, nor the "no additional equipment on the ground nor people on the ground" part. Their favored option costs about $330,000 per airplane, and wont work without billions of dollars spent on new people and equipment on the ground (can you say "user fees"). I don't like that their option has a NAS capacity limit lower than the present problematic system (can you say "turn off your collision avoidance equipment, because you have entered busy airspace, so that others more important than you can utilize the service"). If you hit, wouldn't you both come down? We can't see you if you don't have yours on. We can't see you if you have yours on, there be too many for the system to handle.
As this proceeds, keep your eye on cost per airplane, which is much less important than total cost to implement and operate, which is yet less important than something called "NAS capacity" (you must turn yours off, you can't see us, we can't see you, this is the FAA's new collision avoidance technology). We, obviously, have the working solution.
There is only one thing keeping you from having this technology today: the FAA.
Visit the FAA & Peacefully Register a Complaint
N +38.53.200 W -77.01.385
their
plan
if it, also, doesn't just fall
over flat dead, too;
but, the pentagon's
don't work either
Ours is the only known solution for the FAA has given to us the worst air traffic delays ever experienced at the same time that we suffer the lowest level of air safety ever.
Do you think you could pass a transponder TSO quiz?
Nobody in the FAA can pass this one. Neither can any FAA DER. While you are wondering why your new Apollo/II Morrow/UPS/ADS-B Nav on the NavCom has an AD on it (because it doesn't work right), or you are wondering why your new Garmin transponder now has an "A" model (because the one before the "A" doesn't put out enough power to meet the TSO requirements), try this quiz.
This has been in FAA certification for years! What to do, when the FAA just refuses to do their job? For certificated aircraft, you will have to build your own avionics:
Don't get caught, realize that you will cause ATCRBS interference, just like TCAS & ADS-B:
Send in the TEXAS RANGERSFor experimental aircraft, which do not require certificated avionics:
For information on an authorized shop near you, contact:If you are interested in adapting your display device software or your transponder design:
Become a TailLight Consortium member
"Problems cannot be solved at the same level of awareness that created them."--Albert Einstein